A Note on Secure Multiparty Multiplication by Lory, Peter & Wenzl, Jürgen
A Note on Secure Multiparty Multiplication
Prof. Dr. Peter Lory, Ju¨rgen Wenzl
University of Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany,
Peter.Lory@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de,
,
Abstract. The protocol of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin (1998) is a well known and
efficient protocol for the secure multiparty multiplication of two polynomially
shared values over Zq with a public prime number q. It requires O(n2k log n +
nk2) bit-operations per player, where k is the bit size of the prime q and n is
the number of players. In previous papers (2007, 2009), the first author has pre-
sented modifications of this protocol, that reduces its complexity to O(n2k) . The
present report gives an additional modification and compares the running times
for these variants by numerical experiments.
1 Introduction
Classical theoretical results [4, 7, 15, 24] show that any multiparty computation can be
performed securely if the number of corrupted participants does not exceed certain
bounds. For a survey of these results the reader is referred to the article of Cramer and
Damga˚rd [8]. However - as Damga˚rd [10] points out - this line of research was clearly
oriented towards basic research and there was not much interest in the efficiency of the
protocols, beyond the fact that they were polynomial time. Thus, it is a high priority
to accelerate the classical protocols. One of the most prominent examples for these
efforts is the paper of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin [13]. Among other results, it presents
a more efficient variant of the Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [4] multiplication
protocol. It gives a protocol for the fast multiparty multiplication of two polynomially
shared values over Zq with a public prime number q. Section 4 further accelerates this
protocol.
Polynomial sharing refers to the threshold scheme originally proposed by Shamir
[22], which assumes that n players share a secret α in a way that each player Pi (1 ≤
i ≤ n) owns the function value fα(i) of a polynomial fα with degree at most t and
α = fα(0). Then any subset of t+ 1 participants can retrieve the secret α (for example
by Lagrange’s interpolation formula) but no subset of, at most, t participants can do
so. At the beginning of the multiplication protocol each player Pi holds as input the
function values fα(i) and fβ(i) of two polynomials fα and fβ with maximum degree
t and α = fα(0), β = fβ(0). At the end of the protocol each player owns the function
value H(i) of a polynomial H with maximum degree t as his share of the product αβ =
H(0). Multiplication protocols of this type are important cryptographic primitives. In
particular, they play a decisive role in comparing shared numbers (see [11]) and in the
2shared generation of an RSA [21] modulus by a number of participants such that none
of them knows the factorization (see [1, 5]).
The multiplication protocol of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin [13] requires one round
of communication and O(n2k log n + nk2) bit-operations per player, where k is the
bit size of the prime q and n is the number of players. In [17] a modification of this
protocol is given, which reduces this complexity to O(n2k + nk2). However, in many
practical situations (e. g. the above mentioned shared generation of an RSA modulus) k
(typically k = 1024) will exceed n and the O(nk2)-term will still dominate. For these
cases, in [18] a protocol is given, which requires only O(n2k) bit-operations per player.
It needs one round of communication.
2 The Network Model and Definitions
It is assumed that the n parties with n ≥ 2t+1 are connected by perfectly secure point-
to-point channels in a synchronous network. Failures in the network are modeled by an
adversary A, who can corrupt at most t of the players under the so-called “honest-but-
curious” model. This means that the adversary is passive and can read the memories of
the corrupted players but not modify their behavior.
Let a be a real number. The symbol ⌈a⌉ (⌊a⌋) denotes the smallest (largest) integer
b with b ≥ a (b ≤ a) . The multiplication protocol is called correct, if the output values
constitute a (t + 1)-out-of-n secret sharing of αβ mod q . It is private, if the adver-
sary can deduce absolutely nothing about the real values of α, β and αβ . The protocol
is called unconditionally secure, if it is correct and private. Unconditional security im-
plies that (under the assumed network model) the protocol cannot be broken even with
infinite computational resources.
For the investigation of the time complexities two basic assumption are made:
a) The addition or subtraction of two k-bit-integers requires ρaddk bit-operations.
b) The multiplication of a k-bit-integer and an l-bit-integer requires ρmultkl bit-opera-
tions. This is a reasonable estimate for realistic values (e.g. k = l = 1024).
The concrete values for ρadd and ρmult are machine dependent (see e.g. Knuth [16]).
3 The Protocol of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin
The protocol in [13] assumes that two secrets α and β are shared by polynomials fα(x)
and fβ(x) respectively and the players would like to compute shares of the product αβ.
Both polynomials are of maximum degree t. Denote by fα(i) and fβ(i) the shares of
player Pi on fα(x) and fβ(x) respectively. The product of these two polynomials is
fα(x)fβ(x) = γ2tx
2t + . . . γ1x + αβ
def
= fαβ(x).
Due to Lagrange’s interpolation formula
αβ = λ1fαβ(1) + . . . + λ2t+1fαβ(2t + 1) (1)
3with the known non-zero constants
λi =
∏
1≤k≤2t+1
k 6=i
k
k − i
mod q . (2)
Let h1(x), . . . , h2t+1(x) be polynomials of maximum degree twhich satisfy that hi(0) =
fαβ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2t + 1. Define
H(x)
def
=
2t+1∑
i=1
λihi(x) , (3)
then this function is a polynomial of maximum degree t with the property
H(0) = λ1fαβ(1) + . . . + λ2t+1fαβ(2t + 1) = αβ .
Clearly, H(j) =
∑2t+1
i=1 λihi(j). Thus, if each of the players Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 2t + 1)
shares his share fαβ(i) with the other participants using a polynomial hi(x) with the
properties as defined above, then the product αβ is shared by the polynomial H(x) of
maximum degree t. These ideas are the basis of the protocol given in Figure 1, where
all operations are in Zq .
Input of player Pi: The values fα(i) and fβ(i).
1. Player Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 2t + 1) computes fα(i)fβ(i) and shares this value by choosing a
random polynomial hi(x) of maximum degree t, such that
hi(0) = fα(i)fβ(i) .
He gives player Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) the value hi(j).
2. Each player Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) computes his share of αβ via a random polynomial H ,
i.e. the value H(j), by locally computing the linear combination
H(j) =
2t+1∑
i=1
λihi(j) .
Fig. 1. The multiplication protocol of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin
Step 1 of the protocol of Figure 1 requires n evaluations of the polynomial hi(x) of
degree t. If Horner’s scheme is used for this purpose, one evaluation requires t multi-
plications of a k-bit integer and an integer with at most ⌈log2 n⌉ bits and t additions of
two k-bit integers. According to the assumptions in Subsection 2 a total of
ρmultntk⌈log2 n⌉ + ρaddntk (4)
4i.e. O(n2k log n) bit-operations per player in Step 1 follows. In Step 2 of the protocol
each player has to compute 2t+1 multiplications and 2t additions of two k-bit numbers.
Consequently,
ρmult(2t + 1)k
2 + ρadd2tk (5)
i.e. O(nk2) bit-operations per player are required. This is consistent with propositions
in Algesheimer, Camenisch and Shoup [1] and Catalano [5].
4 Accelerations of the protocol of Gennaro, Rabin and Rabin
An acceleration of Step 1 of the protocol of Figure 1 is given in [17]. It reduces the
complexity from O(n2k log n) to O(n2k) . A comparison of the running times on the
basis of numerical experiments is given in [23].
An acceleration of Step 2 of the protocol of Figure 1 is given in [18]. It reduces the
number of bit-operations per player from Equation (5), which is O(nk2), to
[t(2t + 1) + 2t]k ,
which is O(n2k) . This reduction is profitable in situations where n is small, which is
often the case.
Another modification of Step 2 is based on the following observation: Let d− 1 be
the degree of a polynomial. Then the (unreduced) coefficients of Lagrange’s interpola-
tion formula with support abscissas i = 1, 2, . . . , d are given by
λ
(d)
i =
∏
1≤k≤d
k 6=i
k
k − i
. (6)
A straightforward calculation yields the values of these coefficients for 1 ≤ d ≤ 6.
They are given in Table 1.
λ
(d)
1 λ
(d)
2 λ
(d)
3 λ
(d)
4 λ
(d)
5 λ
(d)
6
d = 1 1
d = 2 2 −1
d = 3 3 −3 1
d = 4 4 −6 4 −1
d = 5 5 −10 10 −5 1
d = 6 6 −15 20 −15 6 −1
Table 1. Coefficients of Lagrange’s interpolation formula (see Equation (6))
For general d:
λ
(d+1)
i =
1 · 2 · . . . · (i− 1) · (i + 1) · . . . · d · (d + 1)
(−(i− 1)) · (−(i− 2)) · . . . · (−1) · 1 · 2 · . . . · (d− i) · (d + 1− i)
= (−1)i−1
(d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · d · (d + 1)
2 · 3 · . . . · i
.
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|λ
(d+1)
i | =
(d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · d · (d + 1)
2 · 3 · . . . · i
,
|λ
(d)
i | =
(d− i + 1) · (d− i + 2) · . . . · (d− 1) · d
2 · 3 · . . . · i
,
|λ
(d)
i−1| =
(d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · (d− 1) · d
2 · 3 · . . . · (i− 1)
,
and
|λ
(d)
i−1|+ |λ
(d)
i | =
i · (d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · (d− 1) · d
2 · 3 · . . . · i
+
(d− i + 1) · (d− i + 2) · . . . · (d− 1) · d
2 · 3 · . . . · i
=
(d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · (d− 1) · d
2 · 3 · . . . · i
· (i + d− i + 1)
=
(d− i + 2) · (d− i + 3) · . . . · (d− 1) · d · (d + 1)
2 · 3 · . . . · i
= |λ
(d+1)
i | .
Thus, the recursion formula
|λ
(d+1)
i | = |λ
(d)
i−1|+ |λ
(d)
i | (7)
follows. Because of this recursion formula and the initial values of Table 1 the following
theorem is proven:
Theorem 1. The coefficients of Lagrange’s interpolation formula with support abscis-
sas i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , d as given by Equation (6) are integers.
Please note that for non-equidistant support abscissas the coefficients of Lagrange’s
interpolation formula are usually fractions. Theorem 1 has the consequence that the
reduced coefficients as given by Equation (2) can be calculated very easily, because
no computation of an inverse is necessary. In order to keep the absolute values of the
coefficients low, the reduction should not be done into Zq = {x ∈ Z|0 ≤ x < q} .
Rather, the coefficients should be from Zq := {x ∈ Z| − q/2 < x ≤ q/2} (cf. [1]). For
small values of d = 2t+1 this guarantees small absolute values for the coefficients and
saves computing time. Table 2 compares the running times of three versions of Step 2
of the multiplication potocol: The first version is given in Figure 1 with coefficients λi
in the interval Zq; the second version is designed for small values of n and is presented
in [18]; the third version exploits the observations of the present subsection and uses
coefficients λi fromZq. All the computations use [14] and are on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo CPU T9400 @ 2.53 GHz for n = 2t + 1 and use the GNU Multiple Precision
Arithmetic Library.
Clearly, the protocols require the same amount of communication, namely one
round. Their communication complexity is O(dn) .
6k = 1024 Reduction to Zq [18] Reduction to Zq
n = 22 + 1 = 5 0.020 0.007 0.005
n = 23 + 1 = 9 0.069 0.032 0.014
n = 25 + 1 = 33 0.872 1.138 0.150
n = 27 + 1 = 129 14.850 60.630 4.060
n = 28 + 1 = 257 64.700 491.660 25.940
n = 29 + 1 = 513 290.600 4097.200 175.000
n = 210 + 1 = 1025 1454.000 35742.000 1328.000
n = 211 + 1 = 2049 6298.000 323978.000 6281.000
Table 2. Running times in milliseconds for three versions of Step 2 of the multiplication protocol
5 Applications
Damga˚rd et al. [11] have presented a protocol that computes, in constant rounds and
with unconditional security, sharings of the bits of a shared value a ∈ Zq with some
prime q . Their protocol works for any linear secret sharing scheme with a multipli-
cation protocol. In particular, this applies to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [22] with
the multiplication protocol of Section 3 and its accelerated modifications of Section 4.
The complexity of the protocol in [11] is O(d log2 k) invocations of the multiplication
protocol for the underlying secret sharing scheme, where k is the bit size of q . Clearly,
the protocol benefits from any improvement of the multiplication protocol as presented
in the preceeding subsections.
The result in [11] immediately implies solutions to other long-standing open prob-
lems such as constant-rounds and unconditionally secure protocols for comparing shared
numbers, raising a shared number to a shared exponent and reducing a shared number
modulo a shared modulus. These techniques enable, for instance, truly practical double
auctions. For more details see [2] and [10].
Distributed signature schemes are another application: Distributed versions of the
Miller-Rabin primality test [19, 20] can be built from the above mentioned protocols.
For details see [1, 5]. This allows the distributed generation of a shared RSA modu-
lus N being the product of two primes or of two safe primes without the need for a
trusted dealer. The subsequent distributed generation of shares of the private exponent
is much less computationally involved. In particular, Boneh and Franklin [3] and Cata-
lano, Gennaro and Halevi [6] present efficient protocols to accomplish this. One of the
main applications of these results is the construction of theshold variants of signature
schemes. In such a scheme n parties hold a (t + 1)-out-of-n sharing of the secret key.
Only when at least t+1 of them cooperate they can sign a given message. The reader is
referred to [6], where two such signature schemes are constructed. The first is an appro-
priate variant of the signature scheme of Gennaro, Halevi and Rabin [12]; the second
relies on the signature scheme of Cramer and Shoup [9]. As all these protocols em-
ploy distributive multiplication as an essential part, they significantly benefit from the
reduction of complexity.
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